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This paper assesses the determinants of enro lment in the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS), a 
heavily subsidized voluntary health insurance scheme in rural China. The analys es focus on the relationship 
between insurance purchase and health facility choice based on data drawn from the China Health and Nutrit ion 
Survey (CHNS). The results show that households from villages that reported use of village clin ics are more 
likely to be insured compared with households from villages that reported use of county hospitals. The results 
indicate that the perception of quality of care is an  important factor affecting  people’s enrolment  decisions. The 
NRCMS is expected to help patients obtain better quality health services from higher-t ier of the healthcare 
system that are unaffordable otherwise. However, given the prevailing fee-for-service payment mechanism for 
health care, the insurance may also drive up the healthcare cost and direct patients to use more expensive and 
unnecessary hospital care.  
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In recent years, several developing countries have expanded, or are in the process of expanding, social health 
insurance with the ult imate aim of achieving universal coverage. Health insurance and risk-pooling schemes are  
commonly considered as desirable ways of enabling households to access health care and reduce potentially  
large out-of-pocket health expenditure. Many governments in developing countries have established social 
health insurance schemes for formal sector employees and recently aim to promote tax-funded schemes 
targeting people working in  in formal sectors , including farmers, ch ild ren, students, migrant workers and elderly  
people without previous employment (Nguyen and Knowles, 2010). For many low- and middle-income 
countries, the informal sector workers usually comprise a large share of the population, h owever, reaching these 
people is considered to be challenging since they do not have formal employer-employee relation that the 
collection of contributions can be based on. Government organised voluntary schemes are often faced with low 
demand among the targeted population groups. Therefore, it  is important to achieve a better understanding of 
the factors driving demand for voluntary health insurance in developing countries.  
China adopted a government-run mandatory insurance program based on employment in 1998, however, the rest 
of the population, such as rural farmers and the unemployed urban poor, still remained uninsured. To achieve 
universal coverage and cover people who were not offered the employer-based insurance program, Chinese 
government introduced two voluntary schemes from 2003 onwards. The first program was the New Rural 
Cooperative Medical Scheme (NRCMS), a heavily  subsidized  voluntary health insurance program introduced in 
2003 and aimed to cover more than 800 million people in rural China. In 2007, another voluntary social health 
insurance program, known as the Urban Resident Basic Medical Insurance (URBMI) scheme, was introduced to 
target 420 million urban residents who were not covered by the compulsory scheme. Both voluntary programs 
are heavily subsidized by central and local governments to increase healthcare access for the poor. 
This study focuses on the NRCMS, of which several features are typical in the developing country setting. The 
targeted population of the NRCMS were p reviously not covered by any other health insurance at all; the 
insurance premium is heavily subsidized by both central and local governments; the program offers a single plan  
to everyone living in  the same county; the reimbursement varies by different levels of government-sponsored 
health facilities; and insured patients may be faced with a wide range of barriers to access health care and 













before the introduction of the NRCMS (Liu and Cao, 1992), the demand for the program was expected to be 
high, and the generous government subsidies should incentivise poor people to take part in the program. In  
addition, given the single plan in each county, consumers can only decide whether or not to purchase the 
NRCMS but not how much to purchase.  
The main network for the provision of health services in ru ral China consists of primary care facilit ies, including 
village clin ics and township health centres , and specialised county hospitals. Although most facilities are 
publicly owned, they rely heavily on revenues from drug sales and service charges to cover the difference 
between operational cost and budget allocation from governments (Liu, 2004). Following the market-oriented 
healthcare reform in the 1980s, the decentralized fiscal system and the commercialisation  of healthcare 
providers have led to various problems, such as lack of funding and supervision for public health facilit ies and 
overuse of high-tech diagnostics and expensive drugs (Duckett et al., 2016, Wong et al., 2017). Most of the 
negative impact fall on primary care facilities, resulting in inadequate funding, poor infrastructure, lack of 
well-t rained clinicians and doctors and low quality of care at primary care level (Liu et al., 2011). At the same 
time, patients have developed a well-founded distrust towards the quality of care provided by facilities at 
lower-tier o f the healthcare system and prefer to use hospital services even for minor conditions (Duckett et  al., 
2016, Eggleston, 2012). Therefore, facility choice is considered to be an important factor in affecting health 
insurance enrolment decisions since the insurance will appear attractive by improving patients’ access to better 
quality health services from higher-level hospitals that are unaffordable otherwise.  
China has achieved impressive insurance coverage in recent years, and the NRCMS covered more than 95 
percent of rural residents in 2010. A better understanding of the determinants of insurance enrolment is 
beneficial fo r policy makers in China and other developing countries to figure out the mechanism underlying the 
take-up decision for social health insurance. This paper starts with the comparison of villages with and without 
the NRCMS, in  terms of population density, economic activ ity, access to infrastructure and social services. It  
then examines factors affecting household enrolment in the scheme among villages where the NRCMS was 
already operating, with a particular focus on whether facility choice is a significant determinant of enrolment. 
Facility choice reflects people’s perceptions about the price and quality of health services covered and 
uncovered by the insurance program. To avoid  unobserved heterogeneity across households, facility choice 
reported at village level is used as the main independent variable. The results show that households of villages 













reported use of county hospitals. Possible reasons may be related with people’s perception of poor quality of 
care provided by village clin ics  and their desire to obtain better services from higher-level health facilities with 
insurance reimbursement. However, potential issues may also arise if the insurance leads to increased use of 
expensive and unnecessary hospital care, while more cost-effective care can be obtained from primary care 
facilities.  
2 BACKGROUND 
Since the transition from a closed centralized p lanned economy to a market  economy in 1978 in  China, there 
was a reduced reliance on general tax revenues for the funding of health services. The existing 
community-based rural health insurance program collapsed in most areas and the health insurance coverage rate 
dropped dramatically from 90 percent in 1980 to 5 percent in 1985 (Liu and Cao, 1992). Since then, most rural 
residents have remained uninsured. By the end of 2002, around 80 percent of the rural population did not have 
any health insurance, and 30 percent of patients could not afford hospitalization when they needed (Wagstaff, 
2009).  
To improve the access to health services for rural res idents, the government introduced the NRCMS in 2003, 
which in itially covered only 10 percent of rural counties in China (Sun et al., 2009). The placement of the pilot 
program was based on a set of criteria, such as local interest and capacity, development of economic status and 
healthcare delivery  systems. By the end of 2008, the insurance was introduced nationally. A ll rural residents are 
eligible for the program and nobody can be rejected based on health status or other considerations.  
The NRCMS operates at the county level, and local governments have a degree of autonomy over premium 
levels. The central government only formulates the lower limit on individual contributions, and each county 
office decides on the premium for its own county within the national range (Liu and Tsegai, 2011). The 
insurance is financed through both household contributions and government subsidies. At its init ial year in 2003,  
the annual premium was 30 RMB (US$3.62) per person, with 20 RMB (US$2.42) from central and local 
governments, and 10 RMB (US$1.21) from households (Ministry of Health et al., 2003). Over time, 
governments gradually increased the subsidies into the program. By 2017, the annual premium increased to 630 
RMB (US$93.2) per person, with 450 RMB (US$66.6) from central and local governments, and 180 RMB 
(US$26.6) from households (Ministry of Health et al., 2012). The premiums are not risk-rated at the individual 













The benefit package of the NRCMS varies across counties and over time according to local resources and 
priorities. County governments have the authority to define local policy details, such as services covered and 
reimbursement rates. In most counties, the program refunds a fraction of inpatient care to patients, but not all 
counties cover outpatient services. The reimbursement rules are usually subjected to a combination of 
deductibles, co-payment, ceilings, and essential medicine and medical service lists to control for healthcare 
expenditure (Sun et al., 2009). The reimbursement rates are set at a higher level for health services delivered in 
lower-level facilities, creat ing incentives for ru ral patients to seek care from primary care facilities first and only 
go to secondary and tertiary care if needed (Li et al., 2017).  
On the supply side, there has been increasing government investment to strengthen the infrastructure and human 
resources for primary care facilities since 2009, with the aim of improving the access, affordability and quality 
of primary care (Yip et al., 2012). Rural China’s healthcare system consists of three tiers: village clin ics, 
township health centres and county (and higher level) hospitals. Village clin ics and township health centres 
form the base of the system and offer basic health services along with disease prevention and health promotion, 
while county hospitals provide the most specialized  inpatient and outpatient medical care (Xing et al., 2015). Of 
these three tiers, county hospitals are usually perceived to offer the highest quality services since they are staffed 
by physicians and nurses with at least four or five years of medical school training at college level. In contrast, 
the majority of the village doctors had no more than a high school education and receive little supervision and 
professional train ing (Eggleston et al., 2006). Since most village doctors are private practitioners and 
substantially underpaid, it  is very d ifficult  to attract and retain  skilled personnel, especially in less developed 
regions of China (Hew, 2006). These underlying problems are the main reasons behind the perception of poor 
quality of primary  care  in  China. Since so far the government has put more emphasis on increasing the quantity 
rather than quality of primary care, the substantial gap in the quality of care delivered by primary care facilities 
and secondary or tertiary hospitals  still exists (Wong et al., 2017). The quality issue is further compounded by 
the preference of general public towards ‘high tech’ and specialist hospital care (Duckett et al., 2016, Eggleston, 
2012). According to a survey conducted among rural villagers in three provinces in China, about 30 percent of 
villagers rated quality of care provided by village clin ics as poor or very poor, while only 10 -20 percent of 
villagers rated the same for township health centres and less than 5 percent for county hospitals (Ratigan, 2015). 
The difference in quality perception appeared particularly  pronounced in poor provinces due to the lack of 













tend to bypass primary care facilit ies and go directly to higher level hospitals even for minor conditions , which 
may lead to healthcare cost escalation (Fe et al., 2016).  
3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is not much evidence on the demand for social health insurance in rural China. Wang et al. (2006) and 
Zhang and Wang (2008) find that individuals with worse health status  are more likely to enrol in the 
community-based health insurance in rural China. Adverse selection mainly occurs in part ially enro lled  
households (Wang et al., 2006), and the magnitude remains similar over time (Zhang and Wang, 2008). Zhang 
et al. (2006) also find that social capital, as measured by recip rocity and trust indices, is significantly  and 
positively associated with the willingness-to-join the insurance. However, all the three studies above analyse the 
demand for Rural Mutual Health Care (RMHC), an  experimental scheme only  introduced in Fengshan township 
(with a population size of around 37,000) in  Guizhou province (the poorest province in China) in 2002. 
Therefore, their results may not be readily generalised to the rest of rural areas. More recently, Liu et  al. (2014) 
examine the enrolment in  the NRCMS based on a large-scale dataset - China Health and Nutrition Survey 
(CHNS) and find that the demand for health insurance is affected by the insurance decisions of co -villagers 
through social learning. However, the paper only focuses on the impact of social learning and does not discuss 
other factors affecting demand. This study should be the first one so far to investigate the relationship between 
health facility choice and enrolment decisions of a social health insurance scheme in the context  of a developing 
country. Facility choice is important in modelling the demand for the NRCMS because it reflects the expected 
benefits of the insurance given various price and quality levels across different levels of health facilities. There 
are a few relevant studies that discuss about the importance of quality perception in preventing people from 
obtaining benefits from health insurance in Vietnam and Lao PDR, suggesting that people tend to give up the 
insurance benefits if they perceive health services covered by the schemes to be of inferio r quality (Alkenbrack 
et al., 2013, Nguyen and Knowles, 2010, Sepehri et al., 2009).  
4 DATA AND METHODOLOGY 













The data used in this study are drawn from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), a large-scale 
longitudinal dataset on Chinese households and their surrounding communities. The sample was selected from 
nine provinces across the eastern, middle and western regions of China, which consist of approximately 56 
percent of the total Chinese population (Jones-Smith and Popkin, 2010). Four counties in each province were 
selected based on the stratification by income, and communities within the counties and households within the 
communit ies were randomly selected. Data were collected in 1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009 
and 2011. There are ind ividual, household and community-level surveys, with detailed information on 
healthcare utilization, socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, health insurance, health facilities and 
social services.  
The study sample only includes people who live in rural areas and hold ru ral registration status (Hukou). The 
village-level analyses are conducted among both NRCMS and non-NRCMS villages in 2004 and 2006, before 
the insurance was rolled  out nationally. The household-level analyses include households living in  villages 
where the NRCMS was introduced and were not covered by any other health insurance scheme. Although the 
survey question on insurance enrolment status did not distinguish between the old Cooperative Medical Scheme 
(CMS) and the NRCMS before 2009, the community heads or health workers reported the introduction dates of 
the insurance in the villages. Since the NRCMS was first introduced in 2003, villages that started the insurance 
in 2003 or later should be considered as NRCMS v illages. To avoid inconsistency in the NRCMS status 
reported by community health workers across years, if a v illage is identified  as an NRCMS village in  one wave, 
it remains to be covered by the insurance in all the following waves. The household-level analyses take use of 4 
waves of data from 2004 to 2011, and the insurance was rolled-out step-by-step across the country in waves 
2004 and 2006. There were 6 NRCMS v illages out of 136 v illages in total in 2004, while the number increased 
to 46 in wave 2006. In waves 2009 and 2011, the majority of the rural villages were already covered by the 
NRCMS.  
The attrition rate of households from 2004 to 2011 is relatively high. No indiv idual appeared in all four waves. 
There were 3,162 individuals who appeared in three waves, 5,894 in two waves, and 3,875 in only one wave. 
The analysis sample only includes individuals who appeared in more than one wave. Sensitivity tests are 
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4.2 FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH INSURANCE AVAILABILITY IN THE VILLAGE 
The determinants of demand for the NRCMS may not generalize to the entire population if the availab ility of 
insurance is systematically selective. For example, the high enro lment rates in p ilot regions may not be easily  
achieved in other areas if the pilot regions have easier access to health facilit ies, better quality health services or 
higher socioeconomic status. Therefore, it is important to investigate whether the availability of the NRCMS is 
correlated with factors that might affect household demand for the insurance. Following the method developed 
by Jones-Smith and Popkin (2010), Table 1 compares villages with and without the NRCMS across 12 domains 
that reflect the urbanicity level of the villages. These 12 domains include population density, economic activ ities, 
traditional/modern markets, transportation infrastructure, sanitation facilit ies, communicat ions, housing, 
education, diversity, health infrastructure and social services. Villages with access to urban social health 
insurance schemes are excluded since they might be suburbs of the cities, and are usually more developed and 
urbanized compared with the rest of rural villages. The variables used for the urbanicity scale are derived from 
individual, household and community-level surveys. Each of the 12 domains is scored from 1 to 10 and added 
up to be the urbanicity scale. Higher scale scores indicate higher levels of urbanization. According to Table 1, 
the villages that introduced the insurance in 2004 appear similar with those that did not, while in 2006 the 
villages without the insurance seem to be more urbanized, in terms of economic activit ies, access to modern 
markets and social services.
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[Table 1 about here] 
4.3 HOUSEHOLD DEMAND FOR THE NRCMS   
Since participation in the NRCMS is on a household basis, all household members are treated as insured if the 
household head is reported as enrolled. The dependent variable is thus defined as a binary indicator of the 
NRCMS household membership and the unit of analysis is at household level. As previously noted, the survey 
makes no distinction between the old and new schemes before 2009, so the insured households living in the 
NRCMS v illages in  waves 2004 and 2006 are assumed to be covered by the NRCMS (Liu  et al., 2014). The 
insurance take-up rates among the NRCMS v illages  are quite high, with an average of 80 percent in 2004, 74 
percent in 2006, 94 percent in 2009 and 96 percent in 2011.   
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 According to Table 1, there are 136 villages in the 2004 sample and 77 villages in the 2006 sample. 60 villages were dropped from 2004 













The main independent variable is health facility choice, which is used as a proxy fo r the observed wide variat ion 
in the price and quality of health services received by patients. To overcome the unobserved heterogeneity 
across households, facility choice is captured at village level rather than at household level. The survey question 
is answered by village health workers and is formulated as  follows “When residents in this village need health 
services, which health facilities can they use?” Respondents can select more than one category from fourteen 
types of health facilities  in total. Five dummies are constructed for village clinics, township health centres, 
county hospitals, city hospitals and other types of health facilities , respectively. The reference category is the 
use of county hospitals, which is omitted from the model.  
Some may argue that the causality between health facility choice and insurance enrolment may run in both 
directions. Since the facility choice variables are defined at village level, it captures an average villager’s 
perception of ability to use different  types of health facilit ies  and helps to reduce some omitted variab le bias  
related with the unobserved health needs at household level. However, simultaneous causality may still exist if 
the households choose their residence on the basis of their willingness-tojoin the NRCMS. In princip le, one can 
identify the causal effect of facility choice on insurance enrolment if there is a valid instrumental variable (IV) 
that is correlated with facility choice but not with insurance enrolment conditional on all other covariates. 
However, finding an appropriate IV seems challenging here since any variable that has an impact on facility 
choice may also have a potential influence on insurance enrolment. The validity of IV remains questionable.  
The analyses use the following model to estimate the demand for the NRCMS:   
𝐼𝑖
∗ = 𝛽 ′𝐶𝑖 + 𝛾
′𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 ,  {
𝐼𝑖 = 1 if 𝐼𝑖
∗ > 0; 
𝐼𝑖 = 0 otherwise 
                                                   (1) 
where 𝐼𝑖
∗ is a continuous and latent variable measuring the net benefits of the NRCMS, 𝐼𝑖 is the observed 
insurance coverage, 𝐶𝑖 denotes the vector of facility choice dummies, 𝑋𝑖  includes a number of household 
characteristics, 𝛽 and 𝛾 are vectors of coefficients, 𝜀𝑖 measures unobserved factors.  
The variables included in 𝑋𝑖  can be broadly classified into two groups: household head characteristics 
including gender, ethnicity, marital status, age, education level (illiterate, finished primary school, junior h igh 
school or senior high school and above), occupation (farmers and others), the presence of major d iseases 
(hypertension, diabetes, heart disease, stroke and asthma) and health risk preference (overweight, smoking and 
daily alcohol drinker); and other household-level characteristics including household size, geographic regions 













percentage of household members older than 55 years old), household income, asset index and percentage of 
household members with major diseases. To account for the potential reverse impact of insurance take-up on 
household income and health risk preference, these variables are lagged by one survey period.  
The analyses begin with a simple logit model containing only health facility choice dummies. To lessen the 
chance that omitted variables are driving the correlation between insurance and facility choice, the model 
subsequently adds demographics, age, income, education levels, health status and risk preference. The most 
comprehensive model also controls for time trend and county fixed effects.  
5 RESULTS:  
5.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for independent variables  by insurance status from 2004 to 2011. The 
heads of the insured households tend to be older people who are married, and belong to ethnic minority groups. 
There is some evidence of adverse selection at household level since insured households tend to have a higher 
proportion of members who are elderly, overweight and have major diseases. The NRCMS may lower their 
costs in ill health states and make them take fewer precautions or invest less in preventive measures. The insured 
also tend to earn higher levels of income, possess more assets and live in eastern and middle provinces.  
 [Table 2 about here] 
5.2 ESTIMATION RESULTS 
Table 3 presents the marginal effects of health facility choice on insurance enrolment by subsequently adding 
different sets of independent variables to test the robustness of the results . Each column of the table represents a 
separate logit.  
Model 1 uses only the facility choice dummies, and five parameters are estimated including the intercept . There 
is a significant positive relat ionship between the use of other types of health facilities and insurance  enrolment. 
However, it is difficult to draw any meaningfu l conclusions from the significant results since the other types 
include both private and government-sponsored health facilities , such as private clinics, district hospitals, army 













In Model 2, a set of six demographic variables are added to the model. These variables include information on 
gender, household size, ethnicity, marital status and regions. The relationship between the use of village clinics  
and insurance purchase increased slightly, and the coefficient becomes significant at 10 percent level. Model 3 
adds three age-related variables: age of the household head and proportions of household members under 18 
years old or above 55 years old. The relationship between the facility choice and insurance enrolment is not 
much affected.  
Model 4 includes two variables representing household income and wealth level . The relationship between the 
choice of village clin ics and the probability of getting insurance becomes significant at 1 percent level. 
Residents in villages that use village clin ics are 3 percent more likely to be covered by the NRCMS compared  
with residents in villages that use county hospitals. In Models 5 and 6, after the addition of three variables on 
education and one variable on occupation, the relationship between the use of village clin ics and insurance still 
remains robust.  
Model 7 includes two health variab les (presence of chronic conditions of household head, proportion of 
household members with chronic diseases), and Model 8 adds risk-related health behaviours of the household 
head (overweight, smoking and alcohol drinking). Both the magnitude and significance of the correlat ion 
between the use of village clinics and insurance enrolment stay the same. Time trend and county fixed effects  
are further controlled in Models 9 and 10. Given that the insurance package differs over time and geographically,  
these variables should explain the majority of the correlation between facility choice and insurance. In fact, 
including these variables largely reduces the relationship between the use of village clinics and the insurance, 
but the coefficient still remains significant at 10 percent level. People in villages that reported use of village 
clin ics are 1 percentage point more likely  to have insurance compared with those from villages that reported use 
of county hospitals. Together, these results present a consistent picture. There is a positive and significant 
relationship between the use of village clin ics and insurance enrolment. The correlation remains significant and 
robust across most of the models.  
 [Table 3 about here] 













This paper investigates the determinants of the NRCMS participation , with a focus on the relationship between 
health facility choice and insurance enrolment. At village level, the scheme has been successfully p iloted in less 
urbanized areas, with poorer access to local and social services. At household level, households of villages that 
reported use of village clinics are more likely to enrol in the NRCMS compared  with households of villages that 
reported use of county hospitals. While there is a lack of exogenous sources of variation in  facility choice  to 
make causal claims, the correlat ion appears robust to a larger number o f addit ional controls . In addition, reverse 
causality should not be a problem since households who are more likely  to get the insurance would  not move to 
villages with better access to village clin ics, given that almost half of the village clinics are not covered by the 
NRCMS. Further sensitivity analyses are also conducted to explore whether the pre-existing health facility use 
at village level in  2000 correlates with the household insurance enrolment from 2004 to 2011. Results indicate a 
statistically significant relat ionship between the use of village clinics and insurance enrolment, with similar 
magnitudes as the coefficients presented in Table 3.
3
 Therefore, it is plausible to interpret the associations as 
showing the preference towards village clinics to affect insurance enrolment rather than the reverse. It is also 
worth noting that the insurance enrolment should not be driven by the variations in insurance benefit packages 
across counties because the last model has controlled  for county fixed effects given that benefit packages are 
defined at county level.  
The results may indicate that the perception of quality of care is an important factor influencing the enrolment in  
the NRCMS. Those who use village clin ics are more likely to enro l in  the insurance since they expect to  obtain 
better quality services from township health centres and county hospitals with insurance reimbursement. The 
impact of quality perception on enrolment in social health insurance is also found in Lao  PDR and Vietnam, 
where people who perceive quality of care covered by the insurance to be poor are  less likely to get enrolled or 
tend to give up insurance benefits  (Alkenbrack et al., 2013, Nguyen and Knowles, 2010, Sepehri et al., 2009). In  
China, the healthcare delivery  system is dominated by government-sponsored hospitals, and primary care 
facilit ies are largely lagged behind the development of hospitals  due to the lack of funding and resources. 
Previous literature has found substantial gaps in the quality of healthcare between primary care facilit ies and 
hospitals, in  terms of the management of chronic d iseases (Li et al., 2017), treatment errors (Sylv ia et al., 2014) 
and overuse of antibiotics (Yin et  al., 2013) and in jections (Liu et al., 2015a, Yang et al., 2014). In addition, 
most patients have an unrealistic expectation towards specialised hospital care, and their sceptics about the 
quality of primary care are not necessarily related with the true quality level (Fe et al. 2016). Patients tend to 
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seek care at secondary or tertiary hospitals even for minor diseases as long as they can afford the services , rather 
than making use of primary care that may better suit their health needs  (Bhattacharyya et al., 2011, Yang and 
Yang, 2009, Yip  and Hsiao, 2014). Since the referral system is almost absent in rural China, people  can choose 
whichever level of health facilities they can afford. The low quality of care and patients’ long-standing distrust 
towards primary  care services make the insurance attractive among people who use village clinics . Therefore, 
improving quality of care at primary care level and encouraging patients to seek appropriate care from low-level 
facilit ies is crucial for the successful implementation of the NRCMS. If the insurance enrolment is associated 
with greater use of hospital services , it can threaten the sustainability and financial viab ility of the NRCMS 
scheme. 
Another key finding is that the incentives to enrol in the NRCMS for people who use township health centres 
and county hospitals  are less strong than those who use village clinics. On the face of it , the finding seems to 
contradict insurance policy since almost half of the village clinics are not government-run and therefore not 
covered by the NRCMS while township health centres and county hospitals are almost always well -covered (Li 
et al., 2017). However, it is important to note that the co-payments are still high at the point of care under the 
NRCMS, due to its low reimbursement levels and limited scope of covered services. In addition, since the 
payments for doctors usually depend on revenues they generate within the hospital, this creates perverse 
incentives for them to over-prescribe drugs and tests for patients, especially the insured ones with better ability 
to pay (Lu, 2014). Most drugs sold in hospital pharmacies are charged at a higher profit margin than the 
wholesale price, and pharmaceutical companies may even offer doctors kickbacks from selling their drugs  (Tam,  
2011, Yip and Hsiao, 2009). Despite the recent introduction of zero drug mark-up policy, some health facilities 
have developed adaptive strategies  by seeking new sources of revenue, such as an increased use of inpatient care 
(Yi et al., 2015). All these factors may contribute to an inefficient healthcare delivery system and drive up the 
cost of health care for insured patients. Policy  approaches to address the distorted behaviour among health 
providers mainly include provider payment reforms that aim to delink income of health facilit ies from drug sales 
or service charges and encourage high-quality clin ical care. These approaches  can be considered as an extension 
of the quality improvement efforts  discussed earlier from primary care to specialised hospital care.  
The NRCMS has achieved near universal coverage by 2011, however, th is is mainly due to the programmatic 
strategy that led to wide but shallow coverage (Yu, 2015). Governments are still faced various challenges of 













mechanis m underlying the NRCMS take-up decision. The lessons learned here could also be of interest to 
governments in other developing countries to achieve universal coverage through social health insurance, 
especially in low-capacity setting where quality of care becomes an issue. In settings where resources are 
limited, governments need to strategically  plan how to efficiently distribute the health spending according to the 
specific health needs of their targeted population. Various options are available, including increasing insurance 
reimbursement rates, extending coverage to outpatient services, investing in the infrastructure and workforce at 
primary care level and implementing provider reforms to reduce supply-induced demand for unnecessary care. 
Policy makers should not only focus on increasing government subsidies in financing the insurance, but need to 
address the structural problems of the healthcare  delivery system as well, such as low quality  of care at  primary  
care level and distorted providers’ behaviour to over-prescribe drugs and services . These problems may increase 
the overall health expenditure  and lead the health system to a vicious cycle of health cost escalation in response 
to increased government funding into the insurance scheme (Yang and Wu, 2017). Thus, strengthening health 
system at grass-root level and launching pilot reform of incentive structures in public hospitals are more 
pressing in the coming years (Yip  and Hsiao, 2008). Both tasks have already been incorporated as  major targets 
in the government action plan issued in 2009 (Chen, 2009). Nevertheless, there is little  evidence that has shown 
significant progress of these policies toward their objectives. Recent studies still identified these issues as the 
main challenges in the current healthcare system (Li et al., 2017, Liu et al., 2015b, Wang et al., 2014, Yang and 
Wu, 2017, Yip and Hsiao, 2014). In addit ion, the system does not routinely collect data on quality of care and 
therefore fails to monitor the progress of quality improvement efforts at different levels of health facilit ies (Li et  
al., 2017). Finally, it is important to integrate village clinics and town hospitals in the healthcare delivery  model 
and let them take on a gate-keeping role to higher-tier hospitals and provide primary care services for the rural 
population (Liu et al., 2011). A well-established referral system is essential to link the primary care, secondary 
and tertiary care p roviders and help to direct patients to use the most appropriate services and reduce the cost 
burden arising from inappropriate use of expensive hospital services . 
Future research on the potential impact of the NRCMS on patients’ treatment -seeking behaviour is underway  in  
which it will be possible to see whether the insured patients will switch to high -level hospitals to obtain better 
quality of care. Given the lack of empirical evidence on people’s care-seeking pattern, the findings would 
provide useful insights for policy makers  on whether the insurance would lead to cost  escalation. 
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Table 1: Insurance availability at village level in 2004 and 2006 
 2004  2006 
 Non-NRCMS NRCMS Difference P-value  Non-NRCMS NRCMS Difference P-value 
Urbanicity scale (overall) 54.50 56.08 -1.58 0.83  52.49 46.75 5.74 0.08
*
 
Population density 5.60 5.42 0.18 0.75  5.73 5.22 0.51 0.12 
Economic activities 4.97 6.42 -1.45 0.24  5.54 4.25 1.29 0.04
**
 
T raditional markets 4.30 1.58 2.72 0.09  3.03 1.94 1.09 0.13 
Modern markets 3.76 6.33 -2.57 0.04
**





5.60 3.89 1.71 0.11  4.95 5.83 -0.89 0.12 
Sanitation 5.51 7.48 -1.97 0.10  4.75 4.58 0.18 0.75 
Communications 5.22 5.99 -0.77 0.17  5.65 5.31 0.34 0.25 
Housing 5.63 6.58 -0.95 0.32  5.41 5.16 0.25 0.57 
Education 2.96 3.19 -0.24 0.60  2.86 2.61 0.26 0.22 
Diversity 4.26 4.25 0.01 0.98  4.54 4.39 0.15 0.49 
Health infrastructure 4.41 3.70 0.71 0.39  4.15 3.49 0.66 0.16 
Social services 2.27 1.25 1.02 0.23  2.18 1.49 0.68 0.03
**
 
Number of villages 130 6    31 46   
Notes: a * indicates statistical significant at 10% level. ** indicates statistical significant at 5% level. b All the variables are defined at village 
level. 
c
 The following definitions of the 12 domains are based on Jones-Smith and Popkin (2010). (1) Population density: total population of 
the village divided by village area; (2) Economic activities: daily wage of an ordinary male worker (RMB), proportion of workforce engaged 
in non-agricultural work; (3) Traditional markets: Distance to and opening hours of the free markets nearby;  (4) Modern markets: number 
of supermarkets in the village, number of modern markets (cafes, internet cafes, indoor restaurants, outdoor fixed and mobile eateries, 
bakeries, ice cream vendors, fruit and vegetable stores and vendors, bars) in the village; (5) Transportation infrastructure: type of the most 
commonly used roads in or around the village, distance to the nearest bus stop, distance t o the nearest train station; (6) Sanitation: proportion 
of households with treated water, proportion of households without excreta present outside the home; (7) Communications: availability of 
cinema, daily newspaper, postal service, telephone service in the village, percent of households with a computer, television or mobile phone; 
(8) Housing: average number of days a week that electricity is available in the village, percent of households in the village with indoor tap 
water, percent of households in the village with flush toilets, percent of households in the village with gas cooker; (9) Education: average 
education level among adults older than 21 years old; (10) Diversity: variation in village education level, variation in village income level;  
(11) Health infrastructure: number and types of health facilities/pharmacies in or near the village (<12km); (12) Social services: provision of 
preschool for children under 3 years old and availability of commercial medical insurance, free medical insurance and insurance for women 













Table 2: Summary statistics of independent variables by insurance status  
Variables Non-NRCMS NRCMS Difference P-value 
Facility choice at village level     
Village clinics 0.70 0.70 0.00 0.99 
Township health centre 0.68 0.69 -0.01 0.46 
County hospitals
+
 0.45 0.43 0.01 0.47 
City hospitals 0.07 0.09 -0.01 0.09 
Other types of health facilities 0.21 0.30 -0.09 0.00
***
 
Household head characteristics     
Female  0.19 0.16 0.03 0.03
*
 
Minorities 0.13 0.16 -0.03 0.01
**
 
Married 0.84 0.88 -0.05 0.00
***
 





 0.26 0.27 -0.00 0.85 
Finished primary school  0.30 0.27 0.03 0.06 
Finished junior high school 0.32 0.35 -0.03 0.06 
Finished senior high school and above 0.12 0.11 0.00 0.65 
Farmer 0.54 0.52 0.02 0.18 
Presence of major diseases 0.14 0.17 -0.03 0.01
**
 
Overweight  0.65 0.72 -0.07 0.00
***
 
Smoking 0.62 0.61 0.01 0.37 
Daily alcohol drinker 0.23 0.22 0.01 0.65 
Household-level characteristics     
Household size 4.36 4.13 0.23 0.00
***
 
East region 0.22 0.26 -0.03 0.01
*
 
Middle region 0.43 0.45 -0.01 0.36 
West region
+
 0.31 0.24 0.07 0.00
***
 
Percentage of household members less than 18 years old 0.20 0.16 0.04 0.00
***
 
Percentage of household members older than 55 years old 0.22 0.26 -0.04 0.00
***
 
Household income 9.57 9.87 -0.30 0.00
***
 
Asset index 1.41 1.54 -0.13 0.00
***
 
Percentage of household members with major diseases 0.07 0.10 -0.03 0.00
***
 
N 1111 11793   
Notes: a Variable names with + are omitted in the regressions as a reference category. b * indicates statistical significant at 10% level. ** 














Table 3: The demand for the NRCMS based on logit regressions from 2004 to 2011: marginal effects of 
facility choice on insurance enrolment  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Model 
10 



















(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Township health 
centres 
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
City hospitals 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 























(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female   0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household size  -0.01
**
 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 






































  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 



















  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 



















  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Age   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 




than 18 years old 
  -0.05
**
 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.00 




than 55 years old 
  0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
  (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Household 
income (lagged) 
   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Asset index 
(lagged) 















    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Finished primary 
school 





     (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Finished junior 
high school 
    -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.00 
     (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Finished senior 
high school and 
above 
    -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Farmer      0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
      (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Presence of 
major diseases 
      -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 -0.01 





      0.02 0.01 -0.00 0.01 
      (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Overweight 
(lagged) 





        (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Smoking 
(lagged) 







        (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Daily alcohol 
drinker (lagged) 
       -0.01 -0.00 0.00 
        (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 





         (0.00) (0.00) 
County fixed 
effects 













Log likelihood -3761.38 -3425.33 -3411.84 -2484.11 -2480.15 -2479.87 -2479.11 -2417.80 -2176.83 -1963.81 
No. Parameters 4 10 13 15 18 19 21 24 25 61 
No. Observations 12904 12165 12164 9925 9921 9921 9921 9784 9784 9471 
pseudo R2 0.007 0.017 0.020 0.046 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.054 0.148 0.224 
Notes: a Robust standard errors clustered at household level in brackets. * indicates statistical significant at the 10% level. ** indicates 
















 This paper assesses the relationship between insurance purchase and health facility choice. 
 The analysis uses data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey. 
 People’s insurance enrolment decisions depend on their health facility choice.  
 Improving quality of care may help to achieve universal health insurance coverage.  
 The study may help to expand insurance coverage in other developing countries.  
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